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The government provision of free or subsidized bed nets 
to combat malaria in Benin allows the identification of 
new channels through which mass media affect public 
policy outcomes. Prior research has concluded that 
governments provide greater private benefits to better-
informed individuals. This paper shows, for the first 
time, that governments can also respond by exploiting 
informed individuals’ greater willingness to pay for 
these benefits. Using a “natural experiment” in radio 
markets in northern Benin, the paper finds that media 
access increases the likelihood that households pay 
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for the bed nets they receive from government, rather 
than getting them for free. Households more exposed 
to radio programming on the benefits of bed nets and 
the hazards of malaria place a higher value on bed nets. 
Local government officials exercise significant discretion 
over bed net pricing and respond to higher demand 
by selling bed nets that they could have distributed for 
free. Mass media appears to change the private behavior 
of citizens—in this case, to invest more of their own 
resources on a public health good (bed nets)—but not 
their ability to extract greater benefits from government.Do Informed Citizens Receive More…or Pay More? 
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1.  Introduction 
The take-up and correct usage of anti-mosquito bed nets to prevent malaria are key 
development issues in Africa and of substantial concern to donors. In order to address behavioral 
and economic constraints to take-up and correct usage, donor- and government-sponsored bed net 
distribution programs rely on both pricing strategies (subsidized or free bed nets) and media 
campaigns. For example, radio broadcasts of health messages is a prominent part of the international 
Roll Back Malaria program. These programs raise three central questions that are the focus of the 
analysis here.  First, the literature shows that households with greater media access are more likely to 
receive cash transfers in more established democracies.  Does media access also improve household 
ability to demand non-cash benefits from government in less established democracies?  Second, 
does radio access increase households‘ adoption of healthy practices?  And, third, does it support or 
undermine the implementation of pricing strategies meant to stimulate the take-up of mosquito bed 
nets?  We examine these questions using original data we collected to exploit a ―natural experiment‖ 
in radio access in Benin, a country with a large donor-funded government program for the 
distribution of free bed nets. Analysis of these data demonstrates significant, and surprising, effects 
of media access.   
With regard to the first question, whether radio access affects household ability to demand 
free bed nets, strong evidence from other parts of the world indicates that governments are more 
likely to target programs offering private benefits to citizens with better access to mass media, 
including natural disaster relief in India (Besley and Burgess 2002), and welfare payments during the 
US Great Depression (Strömberg 2004).  The results here, in contrast, show that in an environment 
with additional barriers to government responsiveness, besides citizens‘ lack of information, greater 
access to mass media does not enable citizens to extract more benefits from government programs.  
As a consequence, and in contrast to prior research, households living in villages with greater radio 
access report no more, and in some specifications significantly fewer, free bed nets.   
On the other hand, radio access does influence household demand for public health goods:  
households living in villages with greater radio access are more likely to report paying for bed nets 
rather than receiving them for free.  Similar to the findings in Keefer and Khemani (2010), that 
media access increases household investment in their children‘s education, we find here that greater 
radio access shifts private household spending to finance the adoption of healthier practices.   
The evidence also reveals a significant effect of media access on the prices that officials 
charge for government-provided goods and services.1  Prior research has examined the effects of 
small changes in prices on both the take-up and intra-household allocation of bed nets, abstracting 
from the presence of media campaigns to boost household demand (Cohen and Dupas, 2008; 
Dupas, 2009).  Results from Benin suggest that radio access increases household valuation of bed 
nets.  In response to this increase in demand, the local officials responsible for bed net distribution 
charge a price for nets that they could have distributed for free.  
These officials could, in principle, meet increased household demand by increasing supply.  
However, in contrast to pricing decisions that are effectively within local discretion, supply decisions 
are not. To increase supply, local officials must petition for and higher authorities must agree to 
                                                 
1 In Benin, the government is the dominant provider of bed nets and donors are the main source of finance for 
government bed net programs. Bed nets are supplied through the regular channels of government health service 
delivery—by local health workers. Section 3 below provides further details. 3 
 
provide a larger allocation of bed nets.  If such a supply response occurred, households with greater 
radio access would report a larger number of bed nets.  In fact, radio access has no effect on the 
total number of bed nets reported by households.  
Further tests on the mechanism of radio effects are consistent with these reduced-form 
results. Households with more access to radio have greater knowledge of health issues that could 
affect their private demand for bed nets. However, they have no greater knowledge of government 
health policies that might influence their ability to hold local officials accountable.   
The data do not reveal whether local officials retain household payments for bed nets as 
rents, or use the payments to finance other improvements in local health services.  Other research 
(e.g., Reinikka and Svensson 2004) has interpreted evidence that local officials do not follow 
centrally-set rules as a sign of ―local capture‖.  Such an interpretation is possible here, as well, since 
international donors, who are significant sources of bed nets provided by African governments, 
prefer free distribution (USAID, 2011). Our results are surprising, however, since they point to 
greater divergence from centrally-set rules precisely in locales where citizens are better-informed.  
One explanation for this different result is ―issue framing‖ in media programming (Prat and 
Strömberg, 2011).  Broadcasts that emphasize the health value of bed-nets trigger different behavior 
by local officials than does programming that emphasizes local government accountability for 
distributing these benefits.  
Data on bed nets and radio access were gathered from a March 2009 survey of 4,200 
households in 210 villages located across the 32 communes of northern Benin.  The design of the 
survey allows us to circumvent three difficulties with estimating the effects of media access on 
whether households receive benefits from government distribution programs.  The first is the lack 
of significant overlap between radio stations‘ broadcast areas and the jurisdiction for which 
government decision makers are responsible.  Absent significant overlap, radio stations may not 
broadcast relevant information.  The second is the endogeneity of media access.  The third is the 
general absence of programmatic distribution of benefits in poor, young democracies.   
With respect to the first difficulty, if the broadcast area of a radio station is much larger than 
the jurisdiction of the relevant government decision maker, it is unlikely that the actions of that 
particular decision maker will be the focus of media attention.  On the other hand, if the broadcast 
area captures only a small part of a decision maker‘s jurisdiction, the individuals informed by those 
broadcasts are less likely to be able to influence decision maker actions. The radio market in this 
region of north Benin provides an appropriate overlap between broadcast area and government 
jurisdiction to test responsiveness to informed citizens. This market consists of twenty-one small, 
private, non-commercial or community radio stations organized at the commune level, the political 
and administrative jurisdiction at which village health center staff are managed and held responsible 
for distributing bed nets to households. Moreover, we can confirm from donor and government 
documents that these radio stations indeed carry programming about bed nets distribution and the 
health value of bed nets.  
We address the identification problem by using a ―natural experiment‖ in these media 
markets in northern Benin, which provide for.  Three characteristics of these markets ensure that 
substantial intra-commune variation in radio access across villages is exogenous to village 
characteristics.  The first is the number and dispersion of small community stations.  Because of the 
sheer number of small broadcasters with limited signal strength, insignificant geographic differences 
between villages lead to substantial variation in village access to radio signals, whether from within 
or from outside the commune.  4 
 
Second, the histories of these stations indicate that founders‘ decisions to establish a radio 
station in a particular commune did not depend on the characteristics of neighboring communes. 
Variation across villages within a commune to signals from neighboring communes is therefore 
particularly likely to be exogenous to village characteristics.   
Third, within every commune, the sample of villages was purposively drawn so that villages 
are approximately equidistant from radio towers and roads, mitigating possible sources of 
endogeneity in village access to within-commune radio stations. We confirm that observable 
characteristics of villages that could be associated with bed nets acquisition are uncorrelated with 
degree of radio access.  
The breadth of bed net distribution programs in Benin circumvents the third difficulty.  In 
younger democracies such as Benin‘s, programmatic policies to distribute benefits are systematically 
under-provided, so there is simply very little to study (Keefer 2007).  Similarly, in young democracies 
programmatic policies may not be politically salient, reducing the likelihood that media would cover 
them or that individuals would listen to media programming.  Benin, though, regularly receives large 
amounts of donor funding to support anti-malaria programs, including the distribution of bed nets.  
For example, in 2007, donors supplied 1.7 million bed nets for free distribution to pregnant women 
and children under five.  Bed net distribution is therefore likely to be sufficiently politically salient to 
trigger media effects on political responsiveness.   
Programmatic policies that provide broad public services such as education are often 
difficult for citizens to evaluate and attribute to government performance, as discussed in Keefer 
and Khemani (2010).  Access to media-provided information is less likely to trigger government 
responsiveness in these cases.  Bed nets do not have this disadvantage:  like welfare payments, for 
which previous research has found substantial evidence of media effects on political responsiveness, 
bed nets offer privately verifiable benefits that have substantial financial and health value to 
households.   
The interactions we uncover between pricing and media strategies to encourage bed net use 
have significant implications for policy.  Recent research has shown that positive prices for bed nets 
can significantly undermine household take-up of bed nets and lead households to shift the 
allocation of bed nets away from its most vulnerable members (Cohen and Dupas, 2008; Hoffman, 
2009).  This has led donors (e.g., the World Bank, WHO, and Population Services International) and 
policy researchers (e.g., the Poverty Action Lab) to endorse the free distribution of bed nets (see 
http://www.povertyactionlab.org/scale-ups/free-insecticidal-bednets).   
However, donor efforts to encourage the take-up of bed nets have a significant media 
component that earlier studies of bed net pricing effects have not been able to take into account.  
The analysis here shows that, in practice, government officials are more likely to require payment for 
bed nets in areas with high media coverage.  This suggests that the large negative effects of cost-
sharing on bed net usage found in the literature may be significantly muted in the presence of media 
interventions that increase demand.   
The results also inform the trend in international development assistance to improve 
governance in poor countries through greater citizen participation, openness and transparency 
(Zoellick 2011).  The results here indicate that, by itself, and in contrast to previous research, the 
media dissemination of general policy information (e.g., on the availability of a government benefit) 
is not sufficient to enable citizens to demand greater benefits from government.  This is because 
incomplete information is only one of several ―political market imperfections‖ (Keefer and Khemani 
2005) that can obstruct collective action by citizens to increase government responsiveness.  The 5 
 
evidence from Benin implies that transparency interventions should focus on how issues are framed 
in order to address these other political constraints.   
The literature review that follows identifies the contribution of the paper both to prior 
research on media effects and to research on the determinants of bed net take-up by households. 
Section 3 describes elements of bed net distribution and the media market in Benin that are essential 
to understanding our empirical strategy.  A discussion of that strategy – the identification of media 
effects – follows next in Section 4.  The empirical hypotheses and results are then presented in 
Section 5.  Our main results show significant effects of media access on the pricing of bed nets.  We 
also present evidence on mechanisms and the effects of radio access on household knowledge.  The 
main results are also robust to numerous alternative specifications.  The conclusion in Section 6 
highlights the policy implications of this work.   
2.  Literature review 
Prior research has found that greater media access by individual households or in narrow 
geographic jurisdictions increases the likelihood that these will receive targeted benefits from 
government programs.  Citizens with greater media access are more informed about these programs 
and more likely to participate in political actions to hold government accountable for the delivery of 
these benefits.  Anticipating this, governments target greater benefits to citizens with greater media 
access (e.g., Besley and Burgess 2002, Strömberg 2004). We find that, in a different policy context 
and institutional setting, governments respond to more informed citizens not by giving them greater 
benefits, but instead, by exploiting these citizens‘ greater willingness to pay for benefits.   
The results here are related to those in Keefer and Khemani (2010), who use the same data 
from northern Benin and find that schools located in villages with greater radio access have no 
greater government-provided inputs (such as teachers or books), nor more responsive public agents 
(lower teacher absenteeism) nor more active PTAs. The research here provides a stronger test of 
whether more informed citizens receive greater benefits.  First, both radio coverage and the pricing 
of government-provided bed nets are local.  In the case of education, key decisions are national or 
departmental, well beyond the coverage of any individual community radio station.  Second, mass 
media is likely to have a larger effect on government responsiveness in the implementation of a 
private benefits distribution program than in the provision of a broader public good like education, 
where government‘s contribution to final outcomes is difficult for households to discern.  
In the case of education, for example, households are uncertain about whether their children 
are learning because of inputs provided by government departments, because of the actions of the 
front-line provider (the teacher), or because of the households‘ and children‘s own efforts. In order 
for media access to improve government accountability for better education services, media would 
have to provide information that allowed households to pinpoint the particular contribution of 
government policies to their welfare. This contribution is easier to define in the case of targeted 
transfer payments (as in previous research), or the provision of free mosquito bed nets, as in this 
paper.  In the case of bed nets, for example, media programming provides sufficient information to 
households to identify the government‘s contribution when it indicates the importance of bed nets 
for the prevention of malaria and broadcasts details of the eligibility and timing of the government‘s 
bed net distribution program.  As with transfer payments, households can immediately verify 
whether the nets are, in fact, freely available.   
Despite the similarities of bed net provision and targeted transfer payments, previous 
research finds a significant effect of media access on the receipt of transfer payments, but we find no 6 
 
effect on the receipt of bed nets.  The analysis here supports explanations for this apparently 
anomalous finding that emerge from two lines of research. 
First, recent research highlights the importance of ―issue framing‖ in analyzing the impact of 
media-provided information on outcomes (Prat and Strömberg, 2011).  The analysis here provides 
an example of its potential importance.  Community radio stations in Benin broadcast the 
information that earlier research has pointed to as key for government responsiveness in delivering 
greater benefits –information about the availability of government bed net distribution programs.  
Nevertheless, households‘ media access in Benin does not in fact translate into greater benefits from 
this program.  Issue-framing may explain why.   
Community radio programming emphasizes the health benefits of bed nets rather than the 
obligation of local officials to provide nets for free.  Donors and international NGOs buy substantial 
air time on radio and are significant sponsors of health programs. They describe their malaria-related 
programming as intended to influence household health practices and to increase household 
valuation of public health goods through ―social marketing‖.  They do not describe programming 
content that emphasizes issues of local government accountability. 
Second, research emphasizes the importance of other types of political constraints to 
government accountability. Keefer and Khemani (2005) suggest two such ―political market 
imperfections‖, other than imperfect information:  societies may be socially polarized, or political 
competition might be rooted in clientelist promises of privately targeted benefits that are only 
delivered within clientelist networks and not influenced by general media access. Keefer and Vlaicu 
(2008) examine how clientelist promises emerge when politicians cannot make credible pre-electoral 
commitments to voters at large. Khemani (2007) further suggests that the type of information 
required to surmount these other political market imperfections is not likely to be easily available 
from mass media in clientelist democracies.  Benin has many of the characteristics of a democracy in 
which clientelist forms of electoral mobilization predominate. 
The analysis here also contributes to the public health literature and research on the effects 
of pricing and media on the usage of bed nets, by showing a significant interaction between pricing 
and media strategies to encourage take-up.  One body of research investigates the effects of pricing 
on whether households acquire bed nets and on how they allocate them once they acquire them.  In 
a randomized experiment in Kenya, Cohen and Dupas (2008) find a high price elasticity of 
demand—uptake drops by sixty percentage points when the price is raised from 0 to $0.60 (about 
eighty percent of the prevailing price in Kenya). 2  Hoffman (2009) compares two randomly selected 
groups of maternal caregivers in Uganda.  One group received cash and the opportunity to purchase 
bed nets and the other received free bed nets.  Relative to all others in the household, net usage by 
the most vulnerable members, children five years and younger, was lower in the group that paid for 
bed nets.  This research abstracts from the impact of media campaigns aimed at increasing the 
demand for bed nets.   Our results show that households with greater radio access and exposure to 
health-related programming are significantly more likely to own paid bed nets, suggesting a possible 
dampening effect on the price elasticity and allocation results reported in the literature.   
Little research examines the effects of different information strategies on bed net usage.  
Dupas (2009) finds that social marketing has no effect on price sensitivity.  We find the opposite, 
                                                 
2 Mahajan, et al. (2009) use non-experimental data and find that among poor households in rural Orissa, one of India‘s 
poorest states, net purchase decisions are insensitive to a 50 percent increase above the prevailing bed net price.  
However, the prevailing price was positive, not zero, in contrast to the Kenya case. 7 
 
looking at a different communications channel:  households exposed to more community radio are 
more likely to have purchased bed nets.   
Finally, a large communications literature shows that focused media programming can 
influence household behavior in public health and family planning, though these studies do not 
control for the endogeneity of radio access (Arnold and Lambino 2009 provide a review).  Other 
work, which does address this endogeneity, does not examine effects on public health products, as 
in the analysis here.  For example, Chong and La Ferrara (2009) report that expanding access to the 
broadcasts of soap operas in Brazil increased rates of divorce and separation; La Ferrara et al (2008) 
find that it reduced fertility.  The potential adverse influence of radio access on household behavior, 
with tragic consequences, was recently quantified in Yanagizawa‘s (2009) work on the impact of 
―hate radio‖ in the Rwandan genocide.   
3.  The institutions for distributing malaria nets, and media access in Benin 
Benin is a small country in Francophone West Africa with a population of about 8,400,000.  
It is appropriate for the study of media effects on government responsiveness for several reasons.  
First, it is sufficiently democratic that results in prior research might suggest that media access would 
increase government responsiveness.3  By the standards of the region, it has a relatively long (20 
year) history of competitive elections and peaceful turnover of political power.  It is also known for 
its vibrant network of local radio media.  According to ratings of Reporters Without Borders from 2009, 
the year of our survey, Benin ranks 72
nd in the world, out of 175, in terms of freedom of the press, 
just behind Brazil (number 71), Botswana, Malawi, Tanzania, Liberia and Togo, but substantially 
ahead of most other African countries.  
Both media and government services are organized by commune.  Benin has 77 communes, 
ranging in population from under 40,000 to over 700,000.  They are the electoral districts from 
which 83 members of the national assembly are elected through a system of party-list proportional 
representation. They are also the lowest tier of government, with each commune government 
consisting of a council of directly elected members who elect a mayor from among their ranks. 
Income per capita is approximately ten times greater in the richest compared to the poorest 
commune.   
The distribution of malaria nets in Benin  
Malaria is endemic throughout Benin. Successive national malaria control programs have 
spent substantial resources on the distribution of insecticide-treated bed nets in the country, nearly 
always with the significant support of foreign donors. Most distribution plans aim for free 
distribution through the government‘s local (village-level) health facilities and staff. These health 
staff and facilities are managed at the commune level.  
Donors and government also support the distribution of some bed nets through social 
marketing by the private sector, at heavily subsidized prices (USAID 2011, p.7 and p. 14), but this is 
a relatively small portion of the bed nets market. For example, the only major private organization 
engaged in distributing subsidized bed nets in Benin, Population Services International (PSI), 
reported selling 75,000 bed nets in 20094, compared to 1,450,000 nets that were distributed by the 
                                                 
3 Our arguments diverge from those in the literature, since young democracies exhibit other, non-informational political 
market failures not discussed in prior literature on media and accountability. 
4 According to an April 23, 2011 email to the authors from, Njara Rakotonirina, Technical Advisor, PSI-Benin.   8 
 
government in 2007, and 800,000 in 2009, under the international Roll Back Malaria program 
(sponsored most notably by UNICEF, the World Health Organization and the World Bank).   
Donors finance and supply the vast majority of bed nets distributed by the government in 
Benin. The United States President‘s Malaria Initiative was responsible for the majority of the nets 
distributed in 2009.5  At the end of 2010, 4.7 million insecticide-treated nets were to be distributed, 
only 125,000 of which were financed directly from the government budget (USAID 2011, p. 19). 
Project documents make clear that donors focus on free distribution, especially targeted to 
vulnerable populations of pregnant women and young children, and not on pricing strategies.  
Targets for USAID contractors, for example, never refer to cost recovery, emphasizing instead 
aggressive goals for the coverage of vulnerable populations. Government policy documents also 
emphasize free distribution because bed nets are classified as ―essential‖ goods (USAID 2011, p. 14).  
On the other hand, as part of the general health financing policy of the government of 
Benin, local health officials are permitted to charge certain fees for health services under national 
guidelines and exemption policies (such as for indigent households, and for essential goods). Local 
health centers are entitled to retain any fees to finance the services they provide. However, because 
the government has little capacity to monitor adherence to guidelines and exemption policies, local 
officials can exercise significant discretion in the prices they charge and to whom they charge them.6 
Local government officials, therefore, have an incentive and the opportunity to charge for bed nets.  
They could use these fees, in collaboration with community committees, to provide more services to 
citizens in their areas.  Of course, they can take also advantage of weak financial controls to divert 
the fees to personal uses.     
In contrast to the control that local authorities exert over pricing, the quantity of bed nets 
allocated to a local health center is determined by the commune-level representatives of the central 
offices of the National Malaria Control Program.. After donor-provided bed nets arrive in the port 
of Cotonou, the government, or NGOs contracted by donors or the government, distributes them 
to targeted areas.  Donors or their contractors often monitor distribution down to the departmental 
level, but not from the department to more than 700 government health centers, nor from the 
health centers to households.7  Local, village officials can only secure larger allocations for their 
health centers if they can persuade commune officials to respond to local information about 
household demand and increase allocations accordingly.  
Anti-malaria campaigns also include communication efforts, including local radio 
programming (USAID 2011, p. 7).  The evidence presented in the next section reflects this: 
community radio stations broadcast significantly more health and education information than other 
stations.  This programming is intended to increase demand for and proper usage of bed nets, in 
part simply by alerting listeners to the imminent arrival of bed nets at local health centers.   
                                                 
5 According to the Plan Intégré des Activités de Lutte Contre le Paludisme pour l‘année 2009 au Bénin, 
http://rollbackmalaria.org/countryaction/docs/warn/beninPlanPNLP2009.pdf, p. 8. 
6 USAID (2011, p. 10 and p. 14) emphasizes the weakness of the country‘s health infrastructure and lack of knowledge 
of government pricing policies. 
7For example, in its 2009 BASICS contract (Basic support for institutionalizing Child survival), USAID expected the 
contractor to ensure that bed net supply logistics were in place with partners down to the departmental level only (not 
the commune or community level) (http://www.fightingmalaria.gov/funding/contracts/basics_task-order.pdf, p. 8). 9 
 
We estimate the effect of radio access on how many bed nets households report, including 
how many they purchased and how many they received for free.  A serious problem of inference 
would arise if anti-malaria media campaigns were focused on those areas targeted for paid bed nets 
and avoided areas where free bed nets were distributed.  There are numerous reasons to conclude 
that this issue does not arise in the Benin context.   
First, policy documents indicate that donors and government exercise little real control over 
the pricing of bed nets, beyond issuing the general instruction of free distribution, everywhere.  
Second, even if they did, no documents that mention communications campaigns indicate that 
donors or governments modulate the campaigns according to their intended pricing strategies.  On 
the contrary, the documents emphasize donor interest in both increasing demand for bed nets and 
promoting their correct usage:  donors prefer to support programming wherever bed nets are 
distributed.  For example, USAID, a major provider of both bed nets and communications 
programs, contracted with Population Services International to provide communications services.  
USAID emphasized in its request for proposal only the objective of increasing demand and proper 
usage, making no mention of pricing issues.8  Finally, third, evaluations of the anti-malaria campaign 
in Benin suggest that donors have difficulties reliably implementing and coordinating their 
communications strategies, which would make coordination with pricing strategies even more 
difficult (Rwagacondo 2009).   
Both the success of these distribution programs in reaching far-flung households, and the 
ability of local officials to charge for bed nets, are evident in our sample.  The analysis is based on 
our survey of 20 randomly selected households in each of 210 villages across northern Benin.  These 
4,200 households responded to a detailed bed net module.9  It asked respondents to list, for each 
bed net currently owned by the household, precisely how it was acquired. The options were:  
purchased from private sellers, purchased from government organizations, received as a donation 
from government, received as a donation from a parent or friend, or some other source.  Of the 
sample households, 86 percent report having at least one bed net of any kind; 69 percent report 
having received at least one free bed net from the government; and 16 percent of households 
purchased at least one government bed net.  
There appears to be considerable scope to increase the supply of bed nets to ensure full 
coverage of all household members. The average household in our sample reports 0.38 bed nets 
(both treated and untreated) for each household member. Our work is therefore undertaken in a 
setting in which the government could respond by providing more bed nets, whether free or for a 
payment, to households that place a greater value on them. A supply response could be particularly 
important for malaria prevention given that old nets are likely to have lost their insecticide treatment 
and have reduced effectiveness against mosquitoes (Dupas, 2009). Media access has no effect, 
however, on the total number of bed nets reported by households.  
                                                 
8 http://www.fightingmalaria.gov/funding/contracts/psi_coop-agreement.pdf.  PSI is a major contractor for the 
development of communications campaigns in Benin.   
9 We do not, however, have reliable data on the actual usage of bed nets by households (who sleeps under the bed nets, 
how regularly, etc.), since information on these dimensions is particularly difficult to collect through multi-purpose 
surveys. Further below in the paper we discuss in more detail how to interpret our results on source of bed nets in terms 
of household usage. We also do not have sufficiently accurate data on whether the bed nets reported by households are 
properly treated with insecticides of the long-lasting kind or whether the insecticide is still effective. These issues are, of 
course, of critical importance in micro-experimental studies of take-up and use of bed-nets (as in Dupas, 2009). Our 
contribution is to examine the more macro effects of exposure to mass media. 10 
 
Media access in northern Benin  
A key feature of media markets in northern Benin is the proliferation of community radios.  
Donor representatives and station managers confirm that they support programming that broadcasts 
general information about bed net availability and announcements regarding the timing of 
distribution.  The prior section emphasizes the discretion of local health centers in the provision and 
pricing of bed nets.  Community radio is also meant to influence the performance of such local 
institutions, either directly, when stations report on that performance, or indirectly, when stations 
sponsor call-in programs in which commune residents can discuss performance.  Community radio 
access could therefore play a significant role in whether households acquire bed nets.  Moreover, the 
same information that encourages households to take advantage of the bed net distribution program 
– telling households of the existence of the program, its eligibility requirements, and how to gain 
access to the program‘s benefits – also (potentially) promotes political accountability, since 
households can easily identify whether they received promised program benefits or not.   
Our data include extensive information about community radio access and characteristics, 
including ownership, licensing, and programming, on all 68 radio stations operating in Benin as of 
March and April 2009.  Table 1 summarizes some of this information.  The national public radio 
station is essentially everywhere in northern Benin.  In addition, though, the region is covered by a 
number of local community stations that are non-commercial by vocation, but also because there is 
no market for commercial advertising.  These stations finance themselves by selling airtime to 
donors and government ministries.  These sponsor programming to encourage households to make 
better decisions regarding health and education, including the acquisition and proper use of bed 
nets.   
The southern region of Benin is more urbanized and densely settled.  Most areas have access 
to multiple national and commercial radio stations and there is little within-commune variation in 
access across villages.  Since our estimation focuses precisely on within-commune differences, we 
focus on the 32 northern communes of Benin.10  These exhibit substantial within-commune 
variation in radio access across villages that is exogenous to village-specific characteristics.   
Table 1:  Access to Radio Stations in North Benin 










No. of health  
programs 
broadcast 
(over the past 
3 months) 
Government-owned  
Public Radio  2  190  2400 watts  33 
Private Non-commercial or 
Community Radio  21  195  207 watts  138 
Private Commercial Radio 
  10  49  476 watts  40 
Religious Radio 
  2  71  .  36 
                                                 
10 Only the northern commune of Parakou is excluded; it is the second largest city of Benin, after the capital region of 
Cotonou in the south. 11 
 
Fourteen of the 21 community radio stations in the sample depend on funds from foreign 
donors and three on funds from non-governmental organizations. Regardless of funding source, all 
of them describe the provision of information on health and education as a ―very important‖ 
objective.  Consistent with this, the average number of health programs reported by station 
managers is large (138) and more than three times greater than for public or private commercial 
radio.  Hence, access to a higher number of community radio stations is likely to be associated with 
exposure to more information about health issues. 
To measure the number of radio stations to which households have access, enumerators first 
asked village-level key informants to list which radio stations they were able to receive.  The 
enumerators also used their own transistor radios to verify and expand on this, if they received 
additional signals.  We did not ask enumerators or village informants to describe the type of radio 
station or the nature of its programming.  Instead, the radio codes from the village survey were 
matched with the radio survey data to examine the nature of programming available to the village.  
Since community radio stations have low signal strength, no single station is accessible to 
more than a few villages in our sample.  However, because the number of community broadcasters 
is large, at least one community signal is accessible to 93 percent of our sampled villages. Only a few 
villages in our sample (23 percent) have access to private commercial radio.  Although private radio 
has greater signal strength, it is concentrated in the southern communes of Benin, outside our study 
area. Government-owned public radio has several relay transmitters allowing it to cover most of the 
villages in our sample (92 percent) with uniform programming.  The information from religious 
stations is less reliable (for example, in the case of signal strength).  However, only 13 respondents 
identified a religious station as their most preferred broadcaster.     
The number of community radios to which villages have access ranges from zero to seven 
stations, averaging 2.4 and with a standard deviation of 1.5.  All but 20 villages in the sample receive 
strong signals from one or more relayers of the national broadcaster and nearly all villages (175) have 
access to both a community radio station and national public radio.   About 23 percent of villages 
have access to private commercial and 34 percent to religious radio stations.   
Of the 3828 households that listen to some radio, 64 percent report listening to at least one 
community radio station and 45 percent report listening to national public radio.11 Only 176 report 
listening to private commercial radio.12 These preferences are consistent with availability (few 
households have access to private commercial radio), and with claims of broadcast media experts 
that the programming of national broadcasters conforms less well to the tastes and linguistic 
preferences of poor households in rural Africa compared to local radio stations (Buckley et al, 2008). 
The observations drawn from the survey are not contaminated by noise from other mass 
media.  Especially in the study area in northern Benin, radio is essentially the only media to which 
most citizens have access.  Twenty-five percent of respondents to the nationally representative 
Afrobarometer (2005) survey of Benin report that their household owns a television.  In the sample 
here, of 4200 households from northern Benin, only eight percent own a television, but 84 percent 
                                                 
11 ―Listenership‖ data was gathered by simply asking households to name the station they listen to and then having our 
investigating team post-code the response for type of radio. We did not directly prompt the household to categorize 
what type of radio they like listening to.  
12 Even among these 176 that report listening to some private commercial radio, only 67 report listening only to 
commercial radio; the rest listen as well to at least one other public or community radio station.   12 
 
own radios; television ownership in this sample is uncorrelated with access to good radio signals.  
Newspapers also have little penetration.  The largest has a circulation of 7,000, and that almost 
entirely in the capital city of Cotonou.  Interviews with radio station staff indicate, however, that 
their news reports about Benin are often prepared based on reports from the Cotonou newspapers.  
4.  Identification—The “natural experiment” in northern Benin  
As in all work on media effects, the analysis here confronts the possibility that unobserved 
factors influence both media access and outcomes of interest, such as whether households have 
received bed nets from the government and whether they have paid for those nets or received them 
for free.  The radio market in northern Benin allows us to use a novel strategy to control for these 
factors.  In particular, many small radio stations with limited signal strength dominate the media 
market, each carrying similar programming that is likely to influence household demand for bed 
nets.  Because the stations are small, dispersed and numerous, villages that are close to each other 
and not separated by any remarkable topographical features can nevertheless exhibit significant 
differences in access.  Short distances and small changes in elevation are enough to degrade the 
signal received by some of them.  These differences are unlikely to affect bed net distribution except 
through their influence on radio access.   
In contrast, previous research has relied on geological features that obstruct broadcasts from 
one or a few large stations (Strömberg, 2004; Olken, 2009; and Yanagizawa, 2009). Researchers 
argue that these topographical features exogenously distinguish areas with more or less radio access.  
Most debate centers on the exclusion assumption, that these features have no direct effect on 
outcomes of interest.  To the extent that topographical differences between communities with more 
and less access are significant, the exclusion assumption is more controversial.  For example, 
geological obstacles that leave communities with less radio access to a large station might also render 
them significantly more isolated in all respects compared to communities with more radio access.  
The effects of radio access are then entangled with those of remoteness.  Issues of external validity 
may also be more pronounced, since the effects of media access on remote jurisdictions may not be 
the same as in the rest of the population.   
The topographical features that yield variation in access to radio signals across villages in our 
sample are exogenous.  However, it is possible that the location of community radio stations is not 
and is related to unobserved characteristics of the villages that receive them.  The histories of 
individual radio stations, our purposive selection of the village sample and the use of commune fixed 
effects substantially mitigate these concerns.   
Most of the small community radio stations were established through the support of donors 
and governments, who cared about reaching remote and rural areas but were otherwise indifferent 
to radio location. By themselves, these selection criteria would be ideal for our purposes.  However, 
donors needed local partners to establish the stations.  Idiosyncratic conditions within communes 
affected which communes yielded such partners.  Ahokpossi (2009) argues that potential radio 
entrants in Benin viewed the commune as their relevant market and took commune-specific 
characteristics into account in deciding whether they would locate.  Commune-specific 
characteristics, related to economic conditions and political struggles within a commune, therefore 
ultimately affected where radios were established   
Gratz (1999) details the history of one of these community radios, Radio Tanguieta located 
in Tanguieta commune in Atacora department.  Local politicians controlled the community radio 
and Gratz reports concerns about embezzlement and over-spending on salaries of numerous radio 13 
 
announcers representing different ethnic groups.  Unobserved, commune characteristics evidently 
subject community radio projects to the same political risks of local elite capture and clientelist and 
ethnic politics as community-based projects in other sectors.  Since these could plausibly affect 
education outcomes, we do not exploit inter-commune differences in community radio access to 
identify radio effects on patterns of bed net distribution.  Instead, all estimates control for commune 
fixed effects and identify the influence of community radio based solely on intra-commune variation 
in radio access. 
Unobserved cultural and economic characteristics of villages may lead some villages to enjoy 
both more access to within-commune community radios and to receive more free bed nets.  To 
address such concerns, we used maps showing the location of villages, radio towers, and major road 
networks to restrict the sample frame to 210 villages that were approximately equidistant to (equally 
remote from) radio towers and roads inside the commune.13  Complementing the fragmentation of 
the Benin radio market, the sampling frame yields variation in within-commune radio access driven 
by station location and transmission conditions that are exogenous to the sampled villages.  
However, most of the variation in access to radio signals is explained by differences in access 
to out-of-commune radio stations.  The average household has access to .63 within-commune 
community radio stations, with a standard deviation of .51.   It has access to 1.78 out-of-commune 
stations, with a standard deviation of 1.45.  Most of the access variation in the sample is therefore 
due to variation in signals from neighboring communes.   
This, however, does not attenuate the ability of our tests to pick up the traditional 
accountability story in the literature:  those households with more access to out-of-commune 
stations are better-informed about the existence of bed net distribution programs, the pricing of bed 
nets and the need for bed nets, all critical ingredients in accountability.  Out-of-commune stations 
do not inform them about the compliance of their local officials with centrally-mandated rules 
regarding pricing, but their personal observation of local official behavior makes this irrelevant. 
If radio access is the product of exogenous factors and if the sampling strategy was 
successful, villages with more and less community radio access within a commune should be 
indistinguishable.  In particular, if observable characteristics of villages do not differ systematically, 
unobservable village characteristics that could cause a spurious relationship between radio access 
and bed-nets distribution are also likely to be the same in villages with more and less radio access.  
In fact, Table 2 shows that radio access is uncorrelated with a wide range of observable village 
characteristics. 
 
                                                 
13 Unfortunately, no data were available on the precise GPS locations of stations and villages to directly control for this 
in our analysis. The best we could do was rely on pictorial maps provided by our local consultants to ―eyeball‖ 
neighboring villages that were located equally distant from radio towers. However, as we discuss below, we are able to 
verify that our sampled villages exhibited no correlation between radio access and observable characteristics of location 
that could independently impact education outcomes. 14 
 
Table 2:  Correlates of village access to community radio 
(Commune fixed effects, robust p-values in parentheses) 
  Number of Community 
Radios 
Share of Community 
Radios 


















Fraction of surveyed households with 











Most common language in village and 





Probability that main language in any two 











Mean number of houses in village with more 











Observations  200  200 
R-squared  0.78  0.69 
Note:  The columns report OLS estimates of the association of measurable village characteristics 
with the number or share of community radio stations to which villages have access, controlling for 
commune fixed effects.   
 
The village survey includes data on village distance from urban centers and to a train or bus 
stop; smaller and more remote villages could both be likely to have fewer accessible radio signals and 
lower investments in health.  The most recent census in Benin, from 2002, has information on 
village population for nearly all of the villages in the sample.  Poorer villages might have unobserved 
characteristics that affect both radio access and be targeted by the government for bed-nets 
distribution. Though there is no census or statistically representative data of incomes and economic 15 
 
conditions at the village-level in Benin, the surveys offer several proxies for village incomes.  Most 
are based on village averages of responses to the household survey:  the percentage of households 
that report their income as belonging to the lowest of the income brackets; the percentages of 
sampled households that report owning a mobile phone and a television; the percentage of 
households surveyed with brick walls; and the percentage with houses with more than five rooms.  
With 20 observations per village, these averages are only precise enough to test whether larger 
income differences separate villages with more and less radio access.  From the village surveys, it is 
also possible to compare villages according to the number of private schools serving the village.   
Finally, village linguistic characteristics could affect which radio markets the village is in and 
be independently related to cultural norms that influence health practices or to the ability of the 
village to attract government programs. Based on the household survey, it is possible to compare 
villages according to, first, the probability that any two of these households would speak the same 
language at home; and, second, an indicator variable for whether the most common language among 
the sample of 20 households in a village is different from the most common language among all the 
households surveyed in the commune in which that village resides.  
Table 2 reveals no statistically significant association between any of these variables and 
either the number of community radios to which villages have access or the share of community 
radios as a fraction of all radios to which a village has access.  The variable closest to significance is 
the distance of a village from the nearest urban center, in the first column, but its effects are small.  
A one standard deviation increase in distance (18.7 kilometers) is associated with access to 
approximately 0.11 fewer radio stations.  Brick walls are more common in villages with a larger share 
of community radios but, the effect is not quite significant and, again, its magnitude is small.  A one 
standard deviation in the fraction of households with brick walls (19 percent) is associated with only 
a three percent greater share of community radios.  No measures of income, wealth, remoteness or 
linguistic diversity are significant.  There is, then, no evidence that villages with access to more 
community radio are significantly different in other ways from villages with less access.   
Table 3 reports the bivariate correlations between radio access and each of the variables. In 
nearly all cases, observable village characteristics are not significantly correlated with community 
radio access. This time, the correlation between village radio access and distance to an urban center 
is statistically significant, but the magnitude is small:  a one standard deviation increase in distance 
(18.7 kilometers) is associated with access to .19 fewer stations (less than .20 of a standard 
deviation).  This observed heterogeneity has no impact on our results.  Among the 75 percent of 
villages that are no more than 32 kilometers from the nearest urban center, the correlation 
disappears.  The results reported below are robust to looking only at this smaller sample of villages. 
The fraction of households reporting incomes of less than 30,000 CFA francs is also 
marginally significantly correlated with community radio access.  A one standard deviation increase 
in this fraction (.21) is associated with access to .12 fewer community radio stations, less than 10 
percent of the standard deviation of community radio access.  Again, however, these differences 
have no effect on the results.  The correlation disappears among the 75 percent of villages where 
fewer than 53 percent of villages report low incomes and the results reported below are robust to 
looking only at this subsample.   
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Table 3:  Bivariate correlates of village access to community radio 
(Bivariate regressions; commune fixed effects; robust p-values in parentheses) 
 
  Coefficients from bivariate 
regression (p-value) 
Village population (1,000s)  .05  (.29) 
Paved road  .33  (.26) 
Potable water source  -.01  (.74) 
Village chief has some primary or secondary 
education 
.23  (.15) 
Distance of village to nearest urban center  -.01  (.09) 
75% of villages < 32 km from nearest urban 
center 
-.001  (.91) 
Distance of village to nearest bus or train stop  -.01  (.25) 
Fraction of surveyed households with income < 
30,000 CFA Francs 
-.57  (.10) 
75% of villages where this fraction is < .53  -.81  (.30) 
Fraction of surveyed households in dwelling with   
brick walls  .58  (.25) 
cement floors  -.11  (.81) 
more than 5 rooms  -.18  (.78) 
Most common language in village and commune is 
the same 
.25  (.31) 
Probability that main language in any two households 
in the village is the same 
-.31  (.57) 
Note:  The columns report OLS estimates of the bivariate associations of measurable village 
characteristics with the number or share of community radio stations to which villages have access, 
controlling for commune fixed effects. 
 
In sum, the fragmentation of the Benin radio market and a sampling procedure that exploits 
variation in access to out-of-commune community radio stations allow us to include more 
homogeneous villages than has been possible in previous research.  Most studies of media impact 
are based on variation across jurisdictions or households in their access to the same large 
broadcasting or publishing outlets.  In contrast, the analysis here is based on within-commune 
variation in village access to small community radio stations.  Unobserved differences between 
commune villages that can access out-of-commune radio broadcasts and those that cannot are likely 
to be insignificant compared to the differences between villages that can access centrally-broadcast 
media and those that cannot.   17 
 
5.  Village-level variation in radio access and bed-nets distribution 
The analysis that follows examines two hypotheses.  First, if radio access enhances 
government responsiveness, households with better access to community radio should be able to 
obtain more bed nets from government distribution programs, particularly free bed nets, than 
households without.  Second, if radio access changes household behavior and increases household 
demand for and valuation of bed nets, then we should, in principle, see an effect on the prices paid 
and quantity of bed nets reported by households.  However, in the institutional setting in Benin 
higher-level government officials decide the quantity of bed nets available in a village.  We expect 
local-level media to have little effect on the decisions of these officials, and therefore little effect on 
the quantity of bed nets supplied locally.   
Instead, if radio access increases household demand supply effects should be largely 
confined to pricing decisions, over which local officials have control. In particular, local officials 
should sell bed nets that they could otherwise distribute for free in areas with greater radio access.  
The second hypothesis, then, is that greater radio access will have a positive effect on the number of 
paid government bed nets that households report and no effect or a negative effect on the number 
of free government bed nets they report. Because higher level officials responsible for allocations are 
less responsive to local media, and because the private market in bed nets is small, greater radio 
access should have no effect on total bed nets in the household.   
The Benin data lend themselves especially well to tests of the effects of media access on 
government accountability, the first hypothesis, since we not only know household access to media, 
we also know the content of media programming.  Prior research has examined the reduced form 
effects of media access on government transfers, implicitly suggesting that these effects arise because 
media raises awareness of the transfer program:  whether a program exists, eligibility for the 
program, how one gains access to program benefits, and when those benefits are available.  
Accountability also requires that citizens know the actors who are responsible for delivering the 
benefits.  Our data allow us to confirm that all of this information is accessible in Benin and is 
broadcast on community radio stations.  
This is significant, since important areas of public policy are often not covered by the media.  
Reports of natural or economic disasters are more intrinsically interesting and attract a wider 
audience than analyses of the efficacy of government education or malaria policy (Drèze and Sen, 
1990; Eisensee and Strömberg, 2007; Khemani, 2007).  This is not a constraint in northern Benin, 
however, since a significant share of the programming of the sample radio stations is dedicated to 
health and education programming.  In addition, malaria policies stand in contrast to public policies 
with complicated production functions, such as education, in which the contribution of government 
to final outcomes is difficult to discern.  Compared to education, media can more easily inform 
citizens about the contribution of government to bed net availability and the effect of bed nets on 
malaria.   
While community radio programming in Benin transmits the information that prior research 
has suggested matters for accountability, two considerations that have emerged more recently in the 
literature may mitigate accountability effects.  The first is the concern about framing discussed earlier 
(e.g., Prat and Strömberg 2011):  even if the information is presented, it may not be framed in such a 
way as to promote an accountability effect.  Second, and related citizens may confront other 
obstacles to holding politicians accountable (―political market imperfections‖, as in Keefer and 
Khemani 2005), that obstruct their efforts to demand better services or higher transfers even if they 
are well-informed about the policy.  18 
 
The political setting in Benin exhibits characteristics which would weaken the capacity of 
citizens to act collectively to sanction non-performing incumbents.  Credible political commitments 
are, in developed democracies, mediated by programmatic political parties.  In Benin, these parties 
are absent.  The number of parties has fluctuated between 129 and 27 since competitive elections 
were first held in 1991.  Over 100 tried to compete in the 2007 elections (Economist Intelligence 
Unit).  None of the four major parties emerging from the 2007 elections had a programmatic 
identity – a basis for making credible commitments to large groups of citizens.  Party 
fractionalization is correspondingly high:  in 2006 the probability that two randomly selected 
legislators do not belong to the same party was 80 percent in Benin, compared to 52 percent in 
Ghana (Beck, et al. 2001).  Even those households with access to mass media should therefore find 
it difficult to participate in collective action to demand access to free bed nets.  Instead, in line with 
Keefer and Vlaicu (2008), their access to free bed nets is more likely to be a function of their 
membership in the right clientelist networks. 
Even if political market imperfections, other than incomplete information, limit the effects 
of media access on government accountability, media access could nonetheless increase household 
demand for bed nets.  If radio stations broadcast pertinent information and households listen to the 
broadcasts of that information, household demand for bed nets should increase.  However, given 
prevailing market institutions in Benin for the supply of bed nets, the most likely response to 
increased household demand, in the absence of higher level government responsiveness, comes 
from the pricing decisions of local officials. Specifically, recalling the considerable discretion in local 
officials‘ pricing decisions but not in quantity supplied, local officials should respond to increased 
demand for bed nets by reducing household access to free nets and requiring them to pay a price in 
areas with high radio access, the second hypothesis. 
These hypotheses are tested with regressions specified according to (1):   
(1)                                                                               , 
where the dependent variable is, in turn, the total number bed nets (from all sources), the number of 
free, government-provided bed nets, and the number of paid government bed nets.  The units of 
observation are household i in village j and commune k;    is a commune fixed effect. If access to 
media increases government responsiveness and household demand for bed nets,        for all three 
bed net variables.  If the second hypothesis is correct, and higher demand for bed nets only leads local 
officials to sell bed nets that could otherwise distribute for free,         for paid government bed nets, 
but is equal to or less than zero for free government bed nets; it is not significantly different from zero for 
total bed nets, given the small private market for bed nets.   
In addition to commune fixed effects, the control variables include the number of children 
in the household and the number of children five years of age or younger, and the number of adults 
and the number of adults over 60.  Malaria poses the greatest dangers for young children and 
pregnant women, and anti-malaria campaigns tend to encourage households to protect these 
populations. The 2007 bed net campaign in Benin specifically targeted young children, five and 
under.  The results below provide no evidence, however, of successful targeting of this group.   
The number of bed nets owned by a household, both through government donations and 
own-purchase, is significantly correlated with the total number of household residents, adults and 
children, but not, controlling for the total numbers of children and adults, with the number of 
children reported as younger than five. This could be because our sample size of households with 
more members of these demographic groups is not sufficiently large to detect such targeting, or 
because of measurement error in members‘ ages, especially around the cut-off of 5 years. The 19 
 
former caveat applies less strongly in our case, since 2,190 households report children under five, or 
more than 56 percent of the sample on which our estimates are based.  
The estimates take into account respondent education, since better-educated households are 
more likely to understand the importance of bed nets.  The regressions also control for a number of 
dichotomous ethnicity and religion variables, in case particular ethnic or religious groups are better 
mobilized to take advantage of government services or, in contrast, more likely to be excluded from 
it.  Estimates also take into account a variety of measures of household income (quality of housing 
construction, cash income levels reported by the household and ownership of mobile phones or a 
television); the marital status of the household head (including single or polygamous), and the 
gender and age of both the respondent and household head.  The television and mobile phone 
variables also serve to control for alternative sources of information that might be available to the 
household.  
Finally, the base specifications also control for a number of village characteristics.  The 
education of the village chief should influence both household demand for bed nets as well as the 
attention that villages receive from government distribution authorities.  The distance of the village 
from the nearest urban center and from the nearest bus stop or train station, as well as the presence 
of paved roads that service the village, affect the costs of distributing bed nets.  The presence of 
functional private schools captures differences across villages in the demand for social services, 
while the presence of a secondary school, literacy center or a health or maternity center control for 
differences across villages in their capacity to attract government resources. 
The base specifications all use the number of bed nets rather than whether households have 
at least one bed net.  Although 86 percent of households have at least one net, variation among 
those households in the number of nets is large:  on average, those with any bed nets have 2.2 bed 
nets, but 30 percent have only one and another 30 percent have at least three.  This variation is key, 
since the number of bed nets in a household determines the actual protection against malaria that 
household members receive.  However, it is possible that radio access should affect whether 
households have any bed nets at all, rather than the number that they have.  This might be the case 
if nets are rationed and income constraints are severe.  In robustness checks that we report, radio 
access also has a significant effect on whether households report any paid bed nets procured from 
government. 
Another key objective in anti-malaria campaigns focusing on bed nets is to encourage 
households to use bed nets pre-treated with insecticide, which provide substantially greater 
protection at low additional cost (Dupas, 2009). Although, as indicated in footnote 8 earlier, we do 
not have reliable data on whether reported bed nets are in fact treated properly with insecticide or 
not, the estimates below separately analyze all household bed nets and only pre-treated bed nets.  
The average household reports 1.9 total bed nets of which 1.6, on average, are pre-treated; it reports 
1.2 government bed nets (paid or free) of which, on average, 1.1 are pre-treated.  Households report, 
on average, .24 paid, treated government bed nets.  In both cases, we ask whether radio access 
affects the quantity of nets received free or for a price.  
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Observations  3,736  3,736  3,736  3,736  3,736  3,736 
Adj. R
2  0.27  0.18  0.11  0.21  0.14  0.11 
Note:  All specifications estimated with ordinary least squares, with commune fixed effects.  Robust p-values, with 
standard errors clustered at the village level, reported in parentheses.   Coefficient estimates of the following controls are 
insignificant and not reported:  ethnic dummies (Adja, Fon, Bariba, Dendi, Yoa/Lokpa, Peulh, Goua/Otamari, Yoruba); 
age and gender of household head; and whether the respondent is Islamic.  The following village controls are 
insignificant and not reported:  whether the village chief has a primary education; whether a paved road serves the 
village; the distance to the closest urban center; the number of functional private schools;  and the presence of a 
secondary school.   
 
Table 4 reports six estimates of equation (1).  The first looks at the effect of radio access on 
the total number of bed nets reported by households; the second focuses only on free, government-
provided bed nets; and the third examines only the number of government bed nets that the 
households paid for (did not receive for free).  Columns four through six repeat the analysis, but 
focus only on bed nets pre-treated with insecticide.  All specifications contain the same control 
variables, including commune fixed effects, and are estimated using ordinary least squares.  The first 
row of Table 4 reports the effects of access to non-commercial private (community) radio.   
Taken together, the community radio coefficients across the six specifications support the 
hypothesis that radio access increases both demand for bed nets and a particular supply response –
the diversion of free bed nets to the paid market by local officials.  Columns 1 and 4 indicate that 
radio access has no significant influence on the total number of bed nets in the household.  This is 
the result we would expect given the dominance of the national government in the supply of bed 
nets and the lack of national government responsiveness to citizens informed by community radio 
broadcasts.  The second and fourth specifications show that more community radio access does not 
increase household access to free government bed nets, treated or otherwise.  On the contrary, the 
coefficients are negative and large, though not statistically significant.  The third and sixth 
specifications show that households with greater community radio access report more paid 
government bed nets.14  
These effects are substantively large when compared to other influences on bed net 
acquisition.   Respondents who completed their elementary education did not have significantly 
                                                 
14 These results are unchanged when the paid government bed net variable is replaced with all bed nets purchased by 
households, including from non-government sources. However, there is no effect of radio on nets reported to be 
purchased from the private sector alone. This is not surprising given that government channels dominate the bed nets 
market in Benin. 23 
 
more paid bed nets; the estimated effect of secondary education is a fraction of the effect of 
community radio.  A one standard deviation increase in community radio access (1.5 stations) is 
associated with .08 additional paid government bed nets (columns three or six).  This effect is 
comparable to that of secondary education:  households where the respondent had completed 
secondary education had .12 more bed nets than households with only primary education.  It is also 
comparable to income effects.  The richest households, those reporting incomes over 44,000 CFA 
francs and cement floors, had approximately .20 more bed nets than households reporting less 
income and no cement floors.   
Table 4 results indicate that targeting effects are weak, so strict adherence to a targeting 
regime is unlikely to explain the lack of media effects on the receipt of free government bed nets.  
One formal criterion used by the government is that every 1.8 persons in a household are entitled to 
one bed net.  Every additional person should therefore yield at last one-half of an additional free 
government bed net.  Instead, column 2 indicates that every additional adult yields .16 and every 
additional child .11 additional bed nets.  Experts also advise that children under five are the most 
vulnerable and should receive nets first.  However, the coefficient on the number of children five is 
not significant, though the results in Table 4 do not address how bed nets are actually allocated (who 
actually sleeps under them).   
The educated have more bed nets than the uneducated, and the effect rises with the level of 
education:  those who completed their elementary education have .1 more bed nets than those who 
did not; those who completed high school have .26 more; and those who completed higher 
education have .54 additional nets (column one).  For secondary and higher education, the 
correlation operates most strongly on the acquisition of paid bed nets.  However, those with only 
elementary education are more likely to have a greater number of free bed-nets, and no significant 
correlation with paid bed nets.  Households in villages with chiefs who have completed secondary 
education also report more total bed nets.   
Policy Knowledge and Media 
Table 4 makes clear that the pathway from media access to greater bed net acquisition is 
unlikely to run through national government responsiveness, since access has no effect on the total 
number of bed nets, and on free bed nets reported by households.  Instead, it is likely to be the 
product of changes in household behavior as a result of exposure to radio programs on malaria and 
malaria prevention, which increase household willingness to pay for bed nets.  To examine the 
mechanisms linking radio access to bed net acquisition, this section estimates the impact of radio 
access on citizen knowledge.  Radio access increases the ability of citizens to hold governments 
accountable for the provision of free bed nets if it provides them with information about the 
program – its existence, eligibility rules, and distribution plans – that they would not otherwise have 
had and if citizens have an incentive to pay attention to it.  It increases household demand for bed 
nets if it informs households about the importance of healthy practices.  The survey has information 
on household knowledge related to both health policies and practices.   
We can estimate the effect of radio access on these two types of knowledge using equation 
(1), substituting knowledge variables for the bed net dependent variables, as in equation (2).   
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With one exception, all of the control variables are the same as in Table 4.  Visits by health workers 
to discuss malaria might be important sources of knowledge; these are therefore controlled for, in 
addition, in all specifications of equation (2).15   
Only one question in the survey, ―What is the government doing to fight malaria?‖, relates 
specifically to household knowledge of government bed net policies.  Unfortunately, it offers only a 
weak test of the hypothesis that radio access has no influence on household knowledge of 
government bed net policies.   First, because of the breadth of the free bed net program, nearly all 
respondents (93 percent) replied, without prompting, that the government distributed free malaria 
nets.  This number is far higher than the 69 percent who actually received a bed net and the 67 
percent who were able to receive more than one community radio station.  Not surprisingly, the first 
column in Table 5 shows that the estimated effects of community radio access on knowledge of 
government bed net campaigns is positive, but insignificant.  Second, the question only reflects 
whether households know of the policy, not whether they know its eligibility rules and distribution 
plans. 
However, the survey contains other questions related to knowledge of general government 
health policies:  can respondents identify the agency responsible for managing government health 
centers (COGECS)?  Do they know the national health policy on providing one health center per 
arrondissement?   And do they know that the fees charged by health centers are supposed to be 
fixed by the national government?  The effects of radio access are entirely insignificant for the first 
two and only borderline significant for the third.  In contrast, there is a significant positive 
correlation of such policy knowledge with whether a health worker has visited the household.16  
This is consistent with the earlier argument:  in an environment in which citizens cannot act on such 
knowledge, radio stations may not broadcast the information or respondents may not pay attention 
to it, attenuating links between relevant knowledge and radio access.  Keefer and Khemani (2010), 
for example, show that radio access has no effect on government inputs into schools and, 
correspondingly, no effect on respondent knowledge of government education policies.   
In contrast, radio broadcasts do appear to increase household knowledge of the importance 
of good health practices.  The survey asked whether respondents knew that the use of oral 
rehydration salts (ORS) is the proper treatment for diarrhea in young children.17  Fifty percent 
answered correctly.  The second column in Table 5 shows that radio access has no effect on ORS 
knowledge, but this is misleading.  The effects of radio on ORS knowledge should matter most for 
respondents who are most likely to need that knowledge:  women with children in the house.  
Consistent with this, female respondents and the number of children in the household are strongly 
correlated with knowledge of ORS – larger than all other variables with the exception of education.   
 
 
                                                 
15 Health worker visits could themselves be the product of radio access and so are not controlled for in our main 
regressions of community radio access on bed nets.  In fact, all of the results in Table 4 are robust to controlling for 
health worker visits and all of the results in this section are robust to omitting health worker visits.   
16 Results on these other policy knowledge variables are not included here in the interests of brevity, but are, of course, 
available upon request. 
17 The ideal knowledge issue to investigate with respect to behavior is whether radio access improves household 
knowledge of the importance of bed nets.  This information is not contained in the survey, however. 25 
 
Table 5:  Community radio access and household health and health policy knowledge 
Dependent variables:  Knowledge of 
gov‘t bed net 
programs? 
Know ORS treatment 
for kids' diarrhea? 
Conditional radio 
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(0.07) 
 








Children x Radio      0.005 
(0.05) 
 








































































Observations  3736  3736  3736  3693 
Adj. R
2  0.04  0.18  0.18  0.05 
Note:  Base specifications, p-values as in Table 4, plus control for health worker visit for malaria discussion.  The third 
column also controls for the indicated interaction terms.  Health worker visit and other coefficients not reported; among 
them, only the income and wealth variables are generally positively and significantly associated with knowledge of ORS. 26 
 
These effects, however, are entirely conditional on access to radio.  The third column reports 
results from interacting the radio access variable with the gender of the respondent and the number 
of children in the household.  Female respondents with no access to radio are no more likely to 
know about ORS treatment; nor are households with children.  However, among respondents in 
which the household respondent is female and the household has the median number of children 
(two), an increase in the number of community radio stations from zero to the median (two) leads to 
a 4.4 percentage point increase in the fraction of respondents who respond correctly to the ORS 
question; 48 percent of all respondents answered this question correctly.   
Another survey question, which is likely correlated with household knowledge of good 
health practices, relates to awareness of the rates of child mortality. Greater knowledge of child 
mortality rates may be especially correlated with health messages related to malaria and the efficacy 
of bed-nets, given that this disease is one of the leading causes of death among children before they 
reach their fifth birthday. Respondents were asked to give a ball-park estimate of child mortality 
rates in Benin—around how many among any 100 children born in Benin would not survive beyond 
the age of five. Only 15 percent of respondents correctly answered with the right range (based on 
national statistics).  The last column in Table 5 shows that village radio access has a significant 
positive effect on correctly identifying the range of child mortality rates in Benin.  These results are 
consistent with media effects on household knowledge of health practices and outcomes, which 
would account for the estimated reduced-form effect of media access on household private 
investment in anti-malaria bed nets. 
Robustness 
The results in Table 4 are robust to a large number of other specifications.  First, the 
estimates are based on household observations.  They are clustered and therefore not assumed to 
have independently-distributed errors at the village level.  However, since bed net distribution could 
be focused on villages, and radio access varies by village, the village could be the more appropriate 
unit of observation.   
Table 6 reports the results of estimating equation (1) at the village level.  The survey includes 
information on village level characteristics that might affect the availability of bed nets, in addition to 
radio access:  the distance of the village to the nearest urban center or to the nearest bus or train 
stop; the number of new potable water sources in the village and whether the village has a paved 
road; the number of functional private schools; whether the village has access to a literacy center of 
health/maternity center; the level of education of the village chief.  All of these are controlled for.  
The village population comes from census data.  Unfortunately, the census has no income data at 
the village level.  We therefore average village responses to the income and housing quality questions 
and control for these averages.  Finally, in a linguistically diverse country, linguistic heterogeneity 
could affect access to bed nets.  We control for two variables, again based on household responses 
to the survey:  whether the main village language and the main commune language are the same; and 
the probability that any two households in the village sample speak the same language.   
The estimates in Table 6 reinforce the results presented in Table 4:  radio access increases 
both the willingness of households to pay for bed nets and the diversion of potentially free bed nets 
into the paid market.  As before, access to community radio has no significant effect on the total 
number of bed nets and a negative, insignificant effect on the number of free bed nets reported by 
households.  In contrast, again as in the earlier estimates, radio access leads households to acquire a 
significantly larger number of paid government bed nets.   27 
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Observations  199  199  199  199  199  199 
Adj. R
2  0.58  0.46  0.36  0.39  0.33  0.37 
Note:  Observations are village-level averages.  Estimates based on ordinary least squares controlling for commune fixed 
effects.  Robust p-values clustered on communes in parentheses.  Coefficient estimates of the following controls are 
insignificant and not reported:  village population; presence of a paved road in village; no. of potable water sources built in 28 
 
2007-08; primary education of village chief; average number of respondents who report income less than 27.5 thousand CFA 
francs; mean no. of respondents who report cement floors; mean no. of respondents with mobile phones; whether most 
common language is the same in village and commune; the probability that any two households speak the same language in 
the home; average number of adults over 60; and the average number of children under five.   
 
Proximity to a bus stop has a significant positive association with the number of treated 
government bed nets in the village, consistent with the possibility that government efforts to 
disseminate bed nets are sensitive to the cost of reaching those households.  The presence of a 
literacy center, but not a health center, is associated with more treated government nets, but with no 
other kind of net.  Results from the fourth specification indicate that villages that lack private 
schools and are further from urban centers are less likely to acquire untreated government nets.   
Table 7 summarizes the results of a number of other robustness tests.  First, radio access 
should influence not only the number, but also the share of government and own-acquired bed nets.  
The first row of Table 7 shows that results are robust to substituting the share of different categories 
of bed nets for the absolute numbers, as in Table 4.  Radio continues to have a significant positive 
impact on the share of own-acquired bed nets, treated or not (the effect on the share of government 
bed nets is, by construction, the negative of this).  It is also possible that the effects of radio access 
should be properly viewed as influencing whether households acquire any bed nets at all.  Results are 
unchanged after substituting dichotomous variables for the number of bed nets, as in Table 4, and 
using a logit specification with commune fixed effects (results not reported).   
The identification strategy of the paper ensures that variations in radio access are exogenous, 
but this may not be the case for other independent variables in the specification in Table 4, 
potentially injecting bias into all of the estimated coefficients.  The second row of Table 4 presents 
the results of regressions that control only for the (exogenous) radio variables and commune fixed 
effects.  The estimated effects of private non-commercial radio on own-acquired bed nets are larger; 
government-sourced bed nets continue to be insignificantly or negatively influenced by radio access. 
A key part of public health policy in Benin, as in other poor countries, is outreach by health 
workers.  The survey asked respondents if they had received a visit by a health worker to discuss 
malaria.  These visits are common:  41 percent of respondents report that a health worker called on 
their household.  While these visits are not predicted by any of the determinants of bed nets in Table 
4, including radio access, their omission from Table 4 specifications may be a source of bias.  The 
third row of Table 8 reports estimates of radio access based on the Table 4 specification, 
supplemented with a dichotomous variable indicating whether households received such a visit.  
Health worker visits have a significant, large and positive correlation with the number of free 
government bed nets received by the household, but no correlation with own-acquired bed nets (not 
reported), suggesting that these visits are associated with the actual delivery of bed nets as part of 
government bed net campaigns.  Controlling for these visits has no effect on the estimated effects of 
radio access on bed net acquisition using own resources.   
The estimates in Table 4 ignore the possible interdependence of demand for government 
and own-investment in bed nets.  The fourth and fifth rows of Table 7 present results of 
specifications that take these effects into account.  The fourth row takes a naïve approach to this 
issue and looks only at the sub-sample of households that should have the strongest demand for 
own investments in bed nets – those who receive no free government bed nets at all.  The 
magnitude of the effect of community radio access is larger here than in Table 4, as one would 
expect.  An alternative approach, controlling for the number of government bed nets in the own-
acquired bed net specification, yields the same result:  the more free government bed nets a 29 
 
household has, the fewer bed nets it acquires using own resources (every additional government bed 
net is associated with .21 fewer non-government bed nets).   
 
Table 7:  Robustness checks:  Coefficient on number of community radios with different 
specifications/samples 
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Note:  Each coefficient is the estimated effect of the number of community radios on the indicated dependent variable, 
from the corresponding specification of Table 4, as modified according to the indication in the first column above.  In 
the last two rows, the number of community radio stations in the specification of Table 4 is replaced with two variables:  
the number of stations broadcasting from inside the commune and the number from outside.  Both coefficients from 
the corresponding regression are reported.   
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The fifth row explicitly allows for the possibility that unobserved household characteristics 
simultaneously influence household access to free government nets and private investments in bed 
nets.  Seemingly-unrelated regressions (SUR) correct for this possibility, allowing for the error terms 
across the government and own-acquired bed nets regressions to be correlated.  Estimating equation 
(1) using SUR again yields a significant effect of access to community radio on the acquisition of bed 
nets using own resources. 
The next three rows look at sub-samples that are more homogeneous with regard to 
remoteness.  The sixth row examines only villages that lack a paved road.  The seventh excludes the 
25 percent of the sample that is nearest to a bus stop and the eighth excludes the 25 percent that is 
furthest away.  Again, the results mimic those in Table 4; access to non-commercial private radio has 
a strong, positive effect on the number of own-acquired bed nets that households report. 
The specifications in Table 4 include all community radios to which villages have access, 
both within and outside their commune.  Given the small size of community radio stations and the 
way in which the sample of villages was selected, village access to both types of radio stations is 
likely to be exogenous.  The arguments underlying identification are strongest, however, for within-
commune variation in village access to out of-commune radio stations.  An important robustness 
issue is therefore whether the main results of the paper – the lack of effect of radio access on the 
number of free bed nets and the positive effect on the number of paid government bed nets – are 
robust to looking at within- and out-of-commune stations separately.  The last two rows of Table 7 
therefore examine a specification in which the number of out-of-commune and of within-commune 
stations replace the single community radio variable in the Table 4 specification.  As in Table 4, 
access to out-of-commune stations has a highly significant positive effect on the number of paid 
government bed nets households report  and no effect on the number of free bed nets; coefficient 
magnitudes are about the same as those in Table 4.   
Many of the robustness specifications yield a significant negative estimate of the effect of 
radio access on the number of free bed nets that households report, consistent with the argument 
that the diversion of free bed nets to paid markets is higher where demand is greater.  Consistent 
with this argument, the effect is most marked for within-commune community radio stations in the 
last two rows of Table 7.   
7. Conclusion 
Previous studies in a fast-growing literature on the role of media and information in 
government accountability show a strong relationship in mature democracies between access to 
media and to government transfers.  In contrast, based on a novel policy and institutional context, 
and using a new identification strategy, our results demonstrate that media may not affect 
government responsiveness in younger democracies where political support rests on clientelist 
promises to voters. In environments such as Benin‘s, where political parties and other vehicles for 
citizen collective action are weak, greater radio access has no influence on whether they receive free 
government bed nets.   
However, in a contribution to another burgeoning line of research focused on the marketing 
and pricing of public health products in poor countries, we find significant effects of media access 
on the number of paid bed nets that households report.  In earlier work, Keefer and Khemani 
(2010) also show that radio access increased household investment in children‘s education.  
However, the results in the analysis here point to an important and previously unobserved 
interaction between marketing and pricing strategies in countries with weak institutions:  marketing 31 
 
efforts to encourage households to take advantage of government health products seem to lead to 
the diversion of those products from potentially free into paid markets.   
An additional contribution of this study is to increase our understanding of the mechanisms 
through which media access influences policy outcomes.  All theories agree that media access 
matters because it increases the transmission of relevant information to households, better enabling 
them to hold government accountable or to make appropriate decisions regarding health, education 
or simply the take-up of government policies.  With the exception of research by Snyder and 
Strömberg (2011) using US data, earlier researchers could not confirm both that media actually 
broadcast relevant information and that media affected respondent knowledge.  The data from 
Benin fill both of these gaps.   
They confirm that radios do broadcast information on health and, specifically, malaria.  
Moreover, these broadcasts are relevant both for accountability (the existence and timing of free bed 
net distribution) and household behavior (the importance of using bed nets).  Nevertheless, 
consistent with the reduced-form estimations that find no effect of radio access on government 
accountability and a significant effect on household behavior, radio access has similarly little effect 
on knowledge relevant for government accountability, namely, government health policies.  Instead, 
access has significant effects on knowledge relevant for private household health practices.   
The data do not allow for an evaluation of the welfare consequences of the diversion of bed 
nets to the paid market.  First, they do not reveal whether local officials use bed net payments to 
subsidize other health interventions provided by health centers, or for private purposes.  Second, 
they do not indicate whether households that pay for bed nets are more or less vulnerable to malaria 
compared to households that would have received the bed nets for free.  Third, we cannot measure 
the effects of media on how households utilize the nets – better utilization may offset any welfare 
losses due to the effects of pricing on how bed nets are distributed across households.   
The literature reviewed earlier yields mixed evidence on whether the shift from free to paid 
bed nets and other health products increases their appropriate use by households most in need of 
them.  The diversion of free bed nets to the paid market may therefore have no significant impact 
on how they are used nor on who uses them.  If this is the case, the results here suggest that the 
main impact of media coverage of malaria and malaria prevention may be to reduce the consumer 
surplus of households while either increasing the welfare of households that receive health care 
subsidized by bed net payments or increasing the welfare of local officials who retain the payments 
received from the sale of bed nets that they would otherwise have had to distribute for free.   
The results point to the need for caution in combining supply- and demand-side 
interventions to improve health practices in poor countries with weak institutions.  On the one 
hand, access to media offers no guarantee that citizens will be able to hold governments accountable 
for the quality of public policies in environments where constraints to political responsiveness are 
more substantial.  On the other hand, radio access can have a substantial positive effect on private 
household health behavior, provided that the stations broadcast relevant programming about the 
importance of health practices.  However, government officials can moderate their strategies for 
distributing health benefits in response to changes in household demand; the potential endogeneity 
of distribution strategies to marketing efforts is a key issue that policy makers should bear in mind. 
Our analysis examines only the effects of media access and does not test the efficacy of 
concerted efforts to broadcast programming that encourages citizens to increase government 
responsiveness.  Evidence from Brazil suggests that greater access to radio played a facilitating role 
in reducing local government corruption during a campaign of public disclosure of audit findings of 32 
 
irregularities in municipal government spending (Ferraz and Finan, 2008)). Tendler (1997) describes 
how a reform-minded state governor in Brazil successfully used radio broadcasts to spread messages 
that undercut municipal patronage politics and increased citizen demand for municipal public health 
services. An open question for future research on accountability interventions in more clientelist 
democracies is, therefore, whether accountability programming can be tailored to local political 
contexts to strengthen political incentives for service delivery. 33 
 
References 
Adsera, A., C. Boix, and M. Payne (2003). ―Are you being served? Political accountability and the 
quality of government.‖ Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 19(2): 445-490 
Ahokpossi, Calixte (2009). ―Regulation, competition and industry growth: three essays with data 
from broadcasting media in Benin,‖ Economics PhD Dissertation, Department of 
Economics, Boston University, Boston: MA 
Andrabi, Tahir, Jishnu Das and Asim Ijaz Khwaja (2008). ―Report Cards: the impact of providing 
school and child test scores on education markets,‖ Working Paper, Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/akhwaja/papers/RC_14Nov08.pdf 
Banerjee, Abhijit, Rukmini Banerji, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Stuti Khemani (2010).  
―Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in education in 
India,‖ American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2(1): 1-30. 
Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh (2001). ―New 
Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions."  World 
Bank Economic Review 15(1): 165-176. 
Besley, Timothy and Robin Burgess (2002).  ―The Political Economy of Government 
Responsiveness:  Theory and Evidence from India.‖  The Quarterly Journal of Economics  117 
(4):  1415-51. 
Besley, Timothy and Andrea Prat (2006). ―Handcuffs for the Grabbing Hand?: Media Capture and 
Government Accountability.‖ American Economic Review 96(3): 720-736. 
Bjorkman, Martina. (2006). ―Does Money Matter for Student Performance? Evidence from a grant 
program in Uganda,‖ Working Paper No. 326, IGIER, University of Bocconi, Milan, Italy 
_____ and Jakob Svensson (forthcoming).  ―Power to the People:  Evidence of a Randomized Field 
Experiment  on  Community-Based  Monitoring  in  Uganda.‖    Quarterly  Journal  of  Economics 
124:2.    
Brunetti, A. and B. Weder (2003). ―A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption.‖ Journal of Public 
Economics 87(7-8): 1801-1824. 
Buckley, Steve, Kreszentia Duer, Toby Mendel and Sean O Siochru, with Monroe E. Price and Marc 
Raboy (2008). ―Broadcasting, Voice, and Accountability.‖ World Bank Institute, The World 
Bank: Washington DC 
Chong, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara (2009).  ―Television and Divorce:  Evidence from Brazilian 
Novelas.‖  Journal of the European Economic Association Papers and Proceedings.  7:2-3, 458-468. 
Cohen, Jessica and Pascaline Dupas (2008).  ―Free Distribution or Cost-Sharing?  Evidence from a 
Malaria Prevention Experiment.‖  NBER Working Paper 14406 (October).   
Drèze, Jean and Amartya Sen (1990).  The Political Economy of Hunger.  Oxford:  Clarendon Press. 
Dupas, Pascaline (2009).  ―What Matters (and What Does Not) in Households‘ Decision to Invest in 
Malaria Prevention?‖  American Economic Review 99:2, 224-230. 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2006).  Benin:  Country Profile.  London:  Economist Intelligence Unit. 34 
 
Eisensee, Thomas and David Strömberg (2007).  ―News Floods, News Droughts, and U.S. Disaster 
Relief.‖  Quarterly Journal of Economics 122:2.   
Ferejohn, John (1986).  ―Incumbent performance and electoral control.‖  Public Choice 50:  5-26 
Ferraz, Federico and Claudio Finan (2008).  ―Exposing Corrupt Politicians:  The Effect of Brazil‘s 
Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes.‖  Quarterly Journal of Economics 123:2, 703-
745. 
Fraser, C. & Restrepo-Estrada, S. (2002). ―Community radio for change and development,‖ 
Development, 45(4), 69-73.  
Grätz, Tilo (2000). ‗Local radio stations in African languages and the process of political 
transformation:  : The case of Radio Rurale Locale Tanguieta in Northern Benin.‖  In 
Richard Fardon and Graham Furniss (eds.), African Broadcast Cultures, London: James Currey, 
110-127. 
Hoffman, Vivian (2009). ―Intra-household allocation of free and purchased mosquito nets.‖ 
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings 99(2): 236-241. 
Keefer,  Philip  (2007).    ―Clientelism,  credibility  and  the  policy  choices  of  young  democracies.‖  
American Journal of Political Science 51:4, 804-821 (October). 
_____ and Stuti Khemani (2005). ―Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding 
Political Incentives for Providing Public Services.‖ World Bank Research Observer. 20 (1): 1–28. 
_____ and Razvan Vlaicu (2008).  ―Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism.‖ Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization 24:2, 371-406 (October). 
Khemani, Stuti (2007). ―Can Information Campaigns Overcome Political Obstacles to Serving the 
Poor?‖ In The Politics of Service Delivery in Democracies: Better Access for the Poor, 
Shanta Devarajan and Ingrid Widlund (Eds.), Expert Group on Development Issues, 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sweden, 2007 
La Ferrara, Eliana, Alberto, and Suzanne Duryea (2008). ―Soap Operas and Fertility: Evidence from 
Brazil,‖ Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Bocconi, Milan, Italy 
http://didattica.unibocconi.it/mypage/upload/49273_20090112_123523_SOAPNOV08.PDF 
Mahajan, Aprajit, Alessandro Tarozzi, Joanne Yong and Brian Blackburn (2009). ―Budgets, 
Information and Malaria in Orissa.‖  Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 
Discussion Paper 08-24 (March).   
Olken, Benjamin (2009).  ―Do TV and Radio Destroy Social Capital?  Evidence from Indonesian 
Villages.‖  American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1:4, 1-33 (October).   
Pandey, Priyanka, Sangeeta Goyal and Venkatesh Sundararaman (2009). ―Community participation 
in public schools: impact of information campaigns in three Indian states.‖ Education 
Economics 13(3): 355-375 
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. (2000).  Political Economics:  Explaining Public Policy.  
Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press.   
Prat, Andrea and David Strömberg (2006).  ―Commercial Television and Voter Information.‖  
Working paper.   
Reinikka, Ritva and Jakob Svensson, (2004). ―Local Capture: Evidence from a Central Government 35 
 
Transfer Program in Uganda.‖ The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(2): 679-705. 
Reinikka, Ritva and Jakob Svensson (2005). ―Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence 
from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda.‖ Journal of the European Economic Association 3(2-3): 
259-267. 
Roll Back Malaria Partnership (2008). Global Malaria Action Plan. 
http://www.rbm.who.int/gmap/gmap.pdf 
Rwagacondo, Claude Emile (2009).  ―Rapport de la Mission d‘Appui du Reseau des Partenaires Faire 
Reculer le Paludisme en Afrique de l‘Ouest (WestAfrica RBM Network: WARN) Au Benin.‖  
Roll Back Malaria website:  
http://www.rollbackmalaria.org/countryaction/docs/warn/beninWARNmissionReport200
9swotAnalysis.pdf 
Snyder, James and David Strömberg  (forthcoming).  ―Press coverage and political accountability.‖  
Journal of Political Economy. 
Strömberg, David (2004).  ―Radio‘s Impact on Public Spending.‖  The Quarterly Journal of Economics.  
117 (4):  1415-51. 
Tendler, J. 1997. Good Government in the Tropics, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, MD 
The World Bank (2009).  Benin – Constraints to Growth and Potential for Diversification and 
Innovation:  Country Economic Memorandum.  Africa Region, The World Bank, 
Washington, DC. 
The World Bank (2007). The World Bank Booster Program for Malaria Control in Africa: Scaling up 
for Impact, A Two-Year Progress Report, Washington, DC 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRBOOPRO/Resources/MALARIAREPORTfi
nalLOWRES.pdf 
USAID (2011).  President's Malaria Initiative, Benin: Malaria Operational Plan FY 2011. 
Yanagizawa, David (2009).  ―Propaganda and Conflict:  Theory and Evidence from the Rwandan 
Genocide.‖  Mimeo, Stockholm University.   
Zoellick, Robert  B. (2011).  ―The Middle East and North Africa:  A New Social Contract for 
Development.‖  Speech delivered to The Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
April 6. 